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THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS1By Charles B. Craver2I.    INTRODUCTIONLawyers negotiate constantly. They negotiate on the telephone, in person, through themail, and through fax and e-mail transmissions, They even negotiate when they do not realizethey are negotiating. They negotiate with their own partners, associates, legal assistants, andsecretaries; they  negotiate with prospective clients and with current clients. They then negotiateon behalf of clients with outside parties as they try to resolve conflicts or structure businessarrangements of various kinds.Most attorneys have not formally studied the negotiation process. Few have taken lawschool courses pertaining to this critical lawyering skill, and most have not read the leadingbooks and articles discussing this topic. Although they regularly employ their bargaining skills,few actually understand the nuances of the bargaining process. When they prepare for bargainingencounters, they devote hours to the factual, legal, economic, and, where relevant, politicalissues. Most lawyers devote no more than ten to fifteen minutes on their actual negotiationstrategy. When most attorneys commence bargaining interactions, they have only three things inmind that relate directly to their negotiating strategy: (1) their planned opening positions; (2)their bargaining objectives; and (3) their bottom lines.
2As bargaining encounters unfold, lawyers move from their opening positions toward theirgoals. Most do not do this in a structured and carefully planned manner. Since they think ofnegotiations as wholly unstructured interactions, they wing it. They follow their instincts andhope for the best. If they only understood how structured bargaining encounters are, they couldgreatly improve their negotiation proficiency. They would appreciate the purpose of each stageand know the best way to accomplish their objectives in each. They would no longer feel lostwhen something unexpected occurs, and they would be able to obtain better results for theirclients. They could also achieve more efficient agreements that would maximize the joint returnsfor both parties.This article will explore the six stages of the negotiation process, and will explain thepurposes of each. We will begin with the importance of thorough preparation, recognizing thatknowledge is power when people negotiate. We will then discuss the preliminary stage duringwhich bargaining parties establish their identities and the tone for their substantive talks. Theinformation exchange will be evaluated, to be sure individuals know the best ways to obtainrelevant information from others and the most effective way to disclose their own criticalinformation. This stage allows the participants to articulate their respective needs and interests tolet each side know which items are more or less important.Once the information exchange is finished, the distributive bargaining commences, as theparticipants seek to claim for their respective sides what is available for division. If thedistributive portion of the process functions well, the parties will move toward an agreement andenter the closing part of their interaction. Once they achieve an agreement, many negotiators partcompany to allow someone to draft the terms of their agreement. They omit the cooperative
33 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 43 (J. Clavell ed.,1983).
4 See ORAN R. YOUNG (ed.), BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OFNEGOTIATION 10-11 (1975).
phase in which they should work to expand the overall pie and maximize their joint returns.It does not matter whether lawyers negotiate to resolve disputes or to structure businesstransactions. A more thorough understanding of the bargaining process will improve their abilityto obtain optimal terms for their clients. It will also diminish the anxiety they experience whenthey negotiate, which is often caused by their lack of understanding of the overall process.Attorneys will begin to enjoy their bargaining interactions, as they move through the variousstages from preparation to efficient final agreements.
II.    THE PREPARATION STAGE: ESTABLISHING LIMITS AND OBJECTIVESIf you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear theresult of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy,for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you knowneither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.3Persons who thoroughly prepare for bargaining encounters generally achieve morebeneficial results than those who do not, because knowledge constitutes power at the bargainingtable.4 Well prepared negotiators possess the knowledge they need to value their impendinginteractions, and they exude a greater confidence in their positions than their adversaries. Theirconfidence undermines the conviction of less prepared opponents and causes those persons toquestion their own positions. As less prepared advocates subconsciously defer to the greatercertainty exhibited by their more knowledgeable adversaries, they tend to make more frequentand greater concessions.
45 See Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions ofMindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L.REV. 601, 649-650 (2002); ABRAHAM P. ORDOVER & ANDREA DONEFF,ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION 32-33 (2002).
A.   CLIENT PREPARATIONWhen attorneys are asked to negotiate on behalf of clients, they must elicit all of therelevant factual information possessed by those clients. They must also determine what thoseclients hope to achieve through legal representation. Clients frequently fail to disclose their realunderlying interests and objectives when they talk with lawyers, because they only consideroptions they think attorneys can obtain for them. It is thus critical for lawyers to carefully probeclient interests and goals, and to listen intently to client responses.5Persons who say they wish to purchase or lease specific commercial property may suggestthat they are only interested in that location. When they are asked probing questions regardingtheir intended use, it may become apparent that alternative locations may be acceptable.Knowledge about these alternatives enhances this side’s bargaining power by providing viableoptions if the current discussions do not progress satisfactorily. Clients contemplating theinvestment of resources in other firms should be asked about their ultimate objectives. Are theywilling to invest their assets in a single venture, or would they prefer to diversify their holdings?Are they willing to risk their capital to achieve a higher return or would they prefer a lessgenerous return on an investment that is likely to preserve their initial investment? Is a businessseller willing to accept future cash payments, shares of stock in the purchasing firm, or in-kindpayments in goods or services provided by the purchasing company?Clients who initially ask for monetary relief through the litigation process may have failed
56 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 101-11 (1981).
7 See HOWARD RAIFFA, NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OFCOLLABERATIVE DECISION MAKING 129-147 (2003).
to consider alternative interests. Someone contemplating a defamation action may prefer aretraction and a public apology to protracted litigation. A person who thinks she was wrongfullydischarged from employment may prefer reinstatement and a transfer to another departmentinstead of a substantial monetary sum. A victim of alleged sexual harassment may prefer anapology and stay-away promise from the harasser to monetary compensation and likely futuredifficulties. If attorneys do not ascertain the real underlying interests of their clients, they mayignore options that may enhance their bargaining positions and help them achieve optimalagreements.6As lawyers explore client interests and objectives, they must try to determine the degreeto which the clients want the different items to be exchanged. Most legal representatives formallyor informally divide client goals into three categories: (1) essential; (2) important; and (3)desirable. “Essential” items include terms clients must obtain if agreements are to be successfullyachieved. “Important” goals concern things clients want to acquire, but which they would bewilling to exchange for “essential” or other “important” items. “Desirable” needs involve itemsof secondary value which clients would be pleased to obtain, but which they would exchange for“essential” or “important” terms.For each item to be negotiated, attorneys should try to determine how much clients valuedifferent levels of attainment.7 For example, money may be an “essential” issue for a person whohas sustained serious injuries in an automobile accident. The client may consider the first
6$200,000 critical, both to make up for lost earnings and to enable him to pay off unpaid medicalbills and increased credit card debt. While the client would like to obtain more than $200,000, hemay only consider amounts above $200,000 “important,” rather than “essential.” As a result, theclient may not consider $400,000 to be twice as beneficial as the initial $200,000. His lawyermay have to obtain $500,000 or even $600,000 before the client would consider the sumachieved twice as good as the first $200,000. Lawyers preparing for bargaining encounters mustmake these calculations for each item to be negotiated. Only by appreciating the degree to whichthe client values different amounts of particular commodities can they hope to obtain results thatwill most effectively satisfy the client’s underlying interests.Attorneys must similarly ascertain the relative values of the various items to be negotiatedwithin each broad category. Does the client value Item A twice as much as Item B or two-thirdsas much? How does Item C compare to Items A and B? It helps to mentally assign point valuesto the various items to enable legal representatives to understand how they can maximize overallclient satisfaction. Legal advocates can use this relative value information to decide which itemsto seek and which items to trade for other terms the client values more highly.When determining client objectives, lawyers should avoid the substitution of their ownvalues for those of their clients, realizing that client interests must guide their negotiationstrategy. Attorneys should be hesitant to tell clients they are wrong when they articulatepreferences the lawyers find strange. While it is appropriate for legal representatives to probestated client goals to be certain the clients appreciate the available alternatives, they should not
78 Under Model Rule 1.2, “A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning theobjectives of representation . . . and shall abide by a client’s decision whether to accept an offerof settlement of a matter.” THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2002SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 9 (2002).
disregard client interests with which they do not agree.8Negotiating lawyers should not be constrained by judicial authority or usual businesspractices. Negotiators can agree to any terms that are legal. Clients often prefer results that couldnot be achieved through adjudications (e.g., retractions in defamation actions or apologies inharassment cases) or which might not be consistent with usual business arrangements (e.g., in-kind payments). Lawyers should not ignore these possibilities merely because courts could notaward them or many business leaders would not approve them. So long as client interests aremaximized, such considerations should be irrelevant.Once client interests and goals are ascertained, lawyers must educate clients about thenegotiation process. They should emphasize the compromises that may have to be made andbegin to prepare the clients for the offers they are likely to obtain. It is best to do this in acautious manner to avoid the undue elevation of client expectations. If client expectationsbecome excessive, settlement discussions might be doomed from the beginning. On the otherhand, if client expectations are unusually low, lawyers should carefully suggest the possibility ofmore generous results and ask for the time they will need to see if they can achieve morebeneficial terms. Clients should also be educated about the time it is likely to take to reachsatisfactory agreements. If they fail to provide their legal representatives with adequate time tonegotiate, they undermine the effectiveness of their own advocates.
89 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, supra note 6, at 101-111. Some litigators,especially defendants, use the term WATNA (Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) toestablish their bottom line.
10 See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789,    1797 (2000); SAMFRITS Le POOLE, NEVER TAKE NO FOR AN ANSWER 60-61 (2nd ed.1991).
B.   LAWYER PREPARATIONOnce lawyers have ascertained the relevant factual information and the underlyinginterests and goals of their clients, they must become thoroughly familiar with the relevant legaldoctrines, economic aspects, and, where pertinent, political agendas. They must develop cogentlegal theories to support their positions, and anticipate the counter-arguments they expectopposing counsel to make. Negotiators confronted by anticipated claims are unlikely to havetheir confidence undermined by those contentions.1.  Calculating Own and Opposing Side’s Bottom LinesAfter attorneys become familiar with the relevant factual and legal matters affecting theirown side, they must determine their bottom line – i.e., their Best Alternative to a NegotiatedAgreement (BATNA).9 What are the best results they could realistically hope to obtain throughother channels? It is critical for negotiators to have a set bottom line to be certain they will notenter into agreements that would be worse than what would happen if no accords wereobtained.10Negotiators who are initially unable to evaluate the results of nonsettlements must takethe time to develop alternatives. This is especially important for transactional experts. Theirclient may be seeking a buy-sell agreement with a single firm or a licensing arrangement withone party. Are there other potential purchasers or sellers they should contact? Other potential
911 See generally JOHN S. HAMMOND, RALPH L. KEENEY & HOWARD RAIFFA,SMART CHOICES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MAKING BETTER DECISIONS (1999).
12 See LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 84-85(1998).
license partners? As alternatives become numerous, they may wish to create decision trees that graphically depict the strengths and weaknesses associated with each option.11 Each limbrepresents a different alternative, with the advantages and disadvantage of each option beinglisted with the likelihood of obtaining those results. This visual approach makes it easier formany individuals to appreciate the comparative values of the different options.When the alternative to a negotiated agreement is an administrative, arbitral, or judicialproceeding, lawyers must carefully assess the likely outcome of the adjudication process. Theymust review the pertinent factual circumstances and legal doctrines, and then evaluate suchsubjective factors as witness credibility and the sympathetic nature of the parties involved. Whenthey attempt to assess the probable trial result, they must not only predict which party is likely toprevail and with what degree of probability (e.g., 50% or 70% likelihood), but also the expectedamount of such an award.12 Suppose the plaintiff has a 20 percent chance of obtaining a $500,000 verdict, a 30percent chance of obtaining a $400,000 verdict, a 30 percent chance of obtaining a $300,000 anda 20 percent chance of a verdict for the defendant. The expected law suit value would be:0.20 (20%) x $500,000 . . . . . . $100,0000.30 (30%) x $400,000 . . . . . . $120,0000.30 (30%) x $300,000 . . . . . .   $90,0000.2 (20%) x. $0 . . . . . . . . . . . .            $0          Expected Value: $310.000
10
13 See HOWARD RAIFFA, supra note 7, at 146-47.
14 Even if the plaintiff is suing under a fee-shifting statute that authorizes awards ofattorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs (e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k) (2000)), they may have other monetary costs and will have definite nonmonetarycosts that still have to be considered.
Attorneys representing clients in litigation situations should appreciate the fact that plaintiffs tendto over-estimate the probability of success and the amounts likely to be awarded, whiledefendants tend to under-estimate these factors.13 Plaintiff representatives should thus discounttheir expected outcome, and defendant representatives should slightly amplify their predictedresult. The monetary and nonmonetary transactional costs associated with settlement andnonsettlement must also be considered. Litigants must recognize that the monetary andpsychological costs of trial must be subtracted from the anticipated plaintiff’s outcome, becausethese costs would diminish the value of any plaintiff judgment.14 Since the defendant would haveto incur these costs no matter who prevails at trial, these defense costs have to be added to thedefendant’s expected result.A similar expected-value analysis should be performed by persons preparing fortransactional encounters. Suppose the owner of a firm is deciding how much they should expectto obtain from the sale of their corporation. Let’s assume the owner believes there is a 10 percentchance the business will sell for $50 million, a 30 percent chance it will sell for at least $45million, a 60 percent chance it will sell for at least $40 million, a 90 percent chance it will sell forat least $35 million, and a 100 percent chance it will sell for at least $30 million. What would bethe expected value of the firm?
11
15 See Russell Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1797-99.
0.10 (10%) x $50,000,000   . . . . . . . . . $5,000,0000.20 (30% - 10%) x $45,000,000 . . . .   $9,000,0000.30 (60% - 30%) x $40,000,000 . . . . $12,000,0000.30 (90% - 60%) x $35,000,000 . . . . $10,500,0000.10 (100% - 90%) x $30,000,000 . . .   $3,000,000          Expected Value: $39,500,000The client must now be asked how much money she really has to obtain to sell herbusiness. She may have to have at least $35 million, and would not accept anything below thatfigure. How willing is she to hold out for the possibility of a higher amount? The attorney andclient must determine how risk averse or risk taking the client is willing to be. A risk taker maybe willing to hold out for $45 million, while a risk averse seller may not be able to hold out muchpast $40 million.Once attorneys have determined their own side’s expected value, they often think theyhave completed this part of the evaluative process. The many lawyers who come to thisconclusion ignore an equally important part of the preliminary equation: their opponent’sexpected value.15 Legal representatives should employ formal and informal discovery techniquesto obtain the relevant information possessed by the opposing party. They must ascertain, to thedegree they can before they begin to directly interact with those individuals, the needs andinterests of their adversaries. This will allow them to predict the items they want that are ofminimal importance to the other side, and which terms the other side wants that are not valued bytheir own client. They must also attempt to determine the alternatives available to the other sideif no agreement is achieved through the current negotiations. If the other side’s nonsettlementoptions are worse than this party’s external options, this side has greater bargaining power. The
12
16 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspectivein BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 45, 46-47 (Kenneth Arrow, Robert Mnookin,Lee Ross, Amos Tversky & Robert Wilson, eds. 1995).
cost of a nonsettlement to this side is less onerous than the cost of nonconcurrence to the otherparty. An appreciation of opponent nonsettlement alternatives also allows this side to prepare anegotiation strategy that will culminate in an offer that should be preferable to the opposingside’s  nonsettlement options.When negotiators endeavor to understand their own client’s strengths and weaknesses andthose of the other side, they must avoid the tendency to over-estimate their own weaknesses andto under-estimate the weaknesses of their opponent.16 Lawyers become intimately familiar withtheir own client’s situations, and tend to amplify their areas of vulnerability. They assume,usually incorrectly, that opposing counsel are as aware of this side’s weaknesses as they are,ignoring the fact they should be able to conceal many of their side’s difficulties when theyinteract with their adversaries. Attorneys should estimate what negative information the otherside is likely to obtain regarding their own client’s circumstances.Lawyers must similarly review the limited information they have generated about theiropponents. Many negotiators overlook the negative factors affecting their adversaries, becausethose pieces of information have been carefully camouflaged. They thus accord their opponentsgreater strength than they deserve. To counteract this tendency, negotiators must ask themselveswhat negative factors may be affecting their adversaries. If they were representing the other side,what would they be concerned about?Plaintiff representatives should consider whether the defendant is willing to assume theexpense of defending a case it is likely to lose and estimate the negative publicity the defendant
13
17 See Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4, 20-30(2002); ROGER DAWSON, SECRETS OF POWER NEGOTIATING 16-17 (2nd ed. 2001);MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 28(1992).
18 See SAMFRITS LePOOLE, supra note 10, at 62-63.
19 See RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE 32-33 (1999).
thinks, even irrationally, may result from a public adjudication. Defense counsel should askwhether the plaintiff can afford to hold out until the scheduled trial date, which may be a year ortwo away. Does the plaintiff wish to have his integrity and/or competence challenged in an openforum? An attorney representing a patent holder should ask herself how much the prospectivelicensee needs – and can develop – the technology being discussed. The lawyer for the potentiallicensee must ask what other parties might exploit the new technology as effectively as his client.2.  Establishing Elevated Aspiration LevelsAttorneys preparing for bargaining encounters must recognize that persons who begintheir interactions with elevated goals obtain more beneficial results than individuals who beginwith modest objectives.17 These goals should always be well above their bottom lines ifnegotiators hope to obtain optimal results.18 Bargainers should not establish modest objectivesmerely to avoid the possibility they might not obtain everything they want.19 While highaspiration bargainers might not achieve their ultimate goals, they usually obtain better resultsthan negotiators with lower objectives.Consistently successful negotiators establish elevated aspiration levels before theycommence interactions with opponents. They ascertain the pertinent factual, legal, and economicissues, and estimate the most generous results they could reasonably hope to obtain. They then
14
20 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiation, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV.1661, 1675 (1997).
21 See RICHARD SHELL, supra note 19, at 24-32.
22 See Russell Korobkin, supra note 17, at 62-63.
increase their objectives and work diligently to formulate arguments that make their seeminglyexcessive goals seem reasonable. Less certain adversaries tend to defer to the overt confidenceexuded by these more thoroughly prepared participants.20Proficient negotiators focus primarily on their aspiration levels when they bargain. Theyonly rely upon their bottom lines when they have to decide whether to continue interactions thatappear to be unproductive. Less skilled bargainers tend to focus excessively on their bottom linesthroughout their interactions. Once they attain these minimal objectives, they relax knowing thatsome agreement will be achieved, and they no longer work hard to surpass their bottom-lines.Observant opponents can discern their relaxed states and become less generous with respect tosubsequent concessions. These bottom-line oriented negotiators thus settle for less generousterms than their cohorts who continue to focus on their aspiration levels throughout theirbargaining encounters.21When individuals prepare for negotiation interactions, they should establish generous –but realistically attainable – objectives. If their goals are entirely unreasonable, they maydiscourage opponents and induce those persons to think that mutually acceptable agreements areunattainable.22 Unusually elevated aspiration bargainers may encounter an additional problem.Once they get into the negotiation and realize that their objectives are not achievable, they maylose this important touchstone and move quickly toward their bottom lines. When bargainers
15
23 See RICHARD SHELL, supra note 19, at 160-61.
determine that their preliminary aspirations are unrealistic, they should take a short recess andestablish new goals they believe are attainable. This gives them elevated benchmarks, well abovetheir bottom lines, which they can use to guide their further negotiation efforts.3.  Formulating Elevated but Principled Opening OffersAdvocates who commence bargaining interactions with raised expectations recognize thatit is impossible for even skilled negotiators to accurately calculate the value of impendingencounters solely from their own side’s perspective. Until they begin to interact with theiropponents, they are not certain regarding the degree to which those individuals want or need theprospective deal. If their adversaries feel compelled to achieve accords, they may accept lessbeneficial terms to ensure the desired results. If their opponents are willing to risk theconsequences associated with nonsettlements, they may hold out for more generous conditions.By beginning the process with heightened position statements, bargainers can preserve theiroptions until they are able to determine whether their assumptions regarding opponent needs anddesires are accurate.Many persons are hesitant to formulate excessive opening positions for fear of offendingtheir opponents. Nonetheless, proficient negotiators attempt to develop the most extremepositions they can rationally defend.23 They realize that if their initial offers are whollyunrealistic, they will feel awkward when they try to justify their positions and undermine theircredibility. On the other hand, they understand that if they begin with modest offers, theyimmediately place themselves at a disadvantage. When in doubt, negotiators should select more,
16
24 See ROGER DAWSON, supra note 17. At 13-18; HERBERT KRITZER, LET’SMAKE A DEAL 54-55 (1991). See generally Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, PsychologicalBarriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994).
25 See Russell Korobkin, supra note 17, at 30-36; RICHARD SHELL, supra note 19, at161-62; Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, supra note 24, at 138-42.
rather than less, extreme opening positions.24 It is far easier to retreat from excessive positionsthan it is to counteract the negative impact of inappropriately diminished offers.Some individuals commence bargaining encounters with modest proposals hoping togenerate reciprocal behavior by their opponents. Opening offers that are overly generous toadversaries are likely to have the opposite effect due to the impact of a phenomenon known as“anchoring.”25 When people receive better offers than they anticipated, they question their ownpreliminary assessments and increase their own aspiration levels. They expect to obtain morebeneficial results than they initially thought possible, and they make initial offers more favorableto their own side. This psychological phenomenon significantly disadvantages advocates whomake overly generous opening offers. Bargainers who begin with parsimonious opening offershave the opposite impact. Adversaries begin to think they will not be able to achieve the resultsthey preliminarily hoped to attain, and they lower their expectations. As opponents decrease theiraspiration levels, they expand the parties settlement range and increase the probability ofsettlement. The lowering of adversary goals simultaneously enhances the likelihood the personswho began with less generous offers will obtain final terms more favorable to their own clients.I demonstrate the impact of anchoring to attorneys by giving them identical fact patternsdescribing an automobile accident. The participants are told they represent the defendant. Onehalf of the participants are informed that the plaintiff lawyer has demanded $60,000, while the
17
26 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 787-94 (2001) (describing the results of a similar studyinvolving magistrate judges asked to estimate the value of identical fact patterns containingdifferent plaintiff demands).
27 See JAMES C. FREUND, SMART NEGOTIATING 122-23 (1992); JOHN ILICH,DEAL-BREAKERS & BREAK-THROUGHS 112 (1992).
28 See STEFAN H. KRIEGER, RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., KATHLEEN H.McMANUS & STEVEN D. JAMAR, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 282-83 (1999).
29 See ANTHONY R. PRATKANIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, AGE OF PROPAGANDA26-27 (1991).
other half are told the plaintiff attorney has demanded $30,000. I ask the participants how muchthey think they will have to pay to resolve this claim. The persons facing the $60,000 demandrespond with significantly higher figures than the people facing a $30,000 demand.26When negotiators formulate their initial offers, they should develop principled rationalesthey can use to explain how they arrived at their stated positions.27 Litigators should thuscarefully explain the exact basis for their offers. How have they valued the past and expectedfuture medical expenses and compensation loses? How have they valued the pain and suffering?Transactional bargainers should do the same thing. How have they valued the real property,building and equipment, accounts receivable, patents and trade marks, good will, etc.? Thedevelopment of a specific value supported by such logical explanations demonstrates a firmcommitment to that position.28 It also makes it more difficult for opponents to dismiss suchpositions without careful consideration of the supporting rationales.29 A principled opening offeroften allows the initiating party to accomplish one other important objective – it may enable thatparty to define the bargaining agenda. If the opponent responds by referring to the differentcomponents used to support the first side’s opening position, this will enable the initiating party
18
30 See Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV.1115, 1117-27 (2003); Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1,14-15 (2002); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski & Andrew Wistrich, supra note 26, at 794-99;Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,211 SCIENCE 453 (1981); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
to dictate the basic areas to be discussed.4.  Choreographing the Impending InteractionOnce legal representatives have determined their bottom lines, aspiration levels, andopening offers, they must plan their bargaining strategies. How do they envision moving fromwhere they begin to where they would like to conclude their encounter? Do they anticipate anumber of small concessions or a few large position changes? What bargaining techniques dothey think would most effectively move their opponents toward their objectives? At what pointduring their interaction do they plan to take a firm stand, hoping to generate beneficial finalterms? The more negotiators visualize a successful transition from their opening positions totheir desired results, the more likely they are to be successful.Proficient negotiators appreciate the importance of planning to reach ultimate offers thatwill be considered attractive by reasonably risk averse opponents. If their offers are whollyunacceptable, it is easy for adversaries to accept the less onerous consequences associated withnonsettlements. On the other hand, most people find it difficult to reject definitive offers that areat least as good as what they think they might achieve through their nonsettlement alternatives.It is beneficial for negotiators to appreciate the impact of gain-loss framing.30 Whenpeople are offered certain gains and the possibility of greater gains or no gains, most tend to berisk averse and accept the certain gains. On the other hand, when persons are offered certain
19
31 See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV.1227 (2003).
losses and the possibility of greater losses or no losses, they tend to be risk takers hoping to avoidany losses. It thus behooves bargainers to formulate offers that appear to provide sure gains totheir opponents. This is usually easy for transactional negotiators who are contemplating thepurchase or sale of businesses or the licensing of new technology, because both sides view thepotential results of these interactions as gains.Defense attorneys have the benefit of gain-loss framing, since their settlement offersalways provide the prospect of certain gains to plaintiffs – and to plaintiff counsel who areusually being compensated under contingent fee arrangements. Plaintiff lawyers, however,appear to be demanding sure losses from defendants. This induces defendants to be more risktaking, hoping to avoid any losses at trial. If plaintiff attorneys can reframe their offers –explaining to defendants that for this sum of money the defendants’ problems will be alleviated –they may induce defendants to behave in a more risk averse manner. This approach wouldencourage defendants to view these offers positively, rather than negatively.Buyers and sellers of tangible and intangible goods should also understand the impact ofthe “endowment effect.”31 People who own goods others wish to purchase tend to overvaluethose items, while individuals who are thinking of buying goods possessed by others tend toundervalue those items. Persons contemplating the sale of goods should thus try not to overvaluethe property they are selling, and prospective purchasers should not be offended by seeminglyexcessive seller aspirations. Objective assessments of the actual value of the properties inquestion should encourage both sellers and buyers to moderate their expectations and allow them
20
32 See generally MICHAEL KORDA, POWER: HOW TO GET IT, HOW TO USE IT194-202 (1975).
to move toward mutually acceptable terms.Bargainers must finally contemplate the contextual factors for their interaction. When andwhere would they prefer to meet with their adversaries? At their own office, their opponent’soffice, or a neutral site? If they schedule sessions at their own office, how should they arrange thefurniture? Competitive bargainers tend to set up furniture arrangements that are adversarial. Forexample, they may have a square or rectangular table with chairs on opposite sides in acombative configuration. Cooperative negotiators may use a round or oval table, and have theparticipants sit on adjacent, rather than opposite, sides, in a less confrontational configuration.Manipulative bargainers may provide raised, comfortable chairs for themselves and short,uncomfortable chairs for their opponents, hoping to place their adversaries at a psychologicaldisadvantage.32
III.    THE PRELIMINARY STAGE: ESTABLISHING NEGOTIATOR IDENTITIES AND                  TONE FOR THE INTERACTIONLawyers who have previously interacted at the bargaining table are usually familiar witheach other’s negotiating styles. They are generally able to commence new negotiations withouthaving to formally establish preliminary ground rules. Nonetheless, they should still take the timeto reestablish cordial environments that will contribute positively to their impending discussions.Individuals who have not had extensive prior dealings with one another should expect to spendthe initial portion of their interaction establishing their personal and professional identities andthe tone for their subsequent discussions.
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34 See Charles B. Craver, Negotiation Styles: The Impact on Bargaining Transactions,DISPUTE RES. J. 48 (Feb.-Apr. 2003).
35 See generally Charles B. Craver, Frequently Employed Negotiation Techniques, 4CORP. COUNSEL’S Q. 66 (1988).
During the preliminary portion of bargaining interactions, lawyers should look forcommon interests they share with opponents. They may be from the same city or state, theyattended the same college or law school, their children attend the same schools, they enjoy thesame music or sports, etc. Persons who can identify and share such common interests enhancethe probability they will like each other and develop mutually beneficial relationships.33Attorneys who are unfamiliar with the negotiating styles of opposing counsel should tryto obtain pre-negotiation information from other people in their own offices and from otherlawyers they know. Can they expect their opponents to behave in an open and cooperativemanner in which they seek to achieve mutually beneficial results or in a closed and adversarialfashion in which they try to maximize their own side’s results?34 Can they anticipate candor ordissembling from those persons? What types of bargaining techniques can they expect the otherside to employ?35Attorneys who encounter seemingly cooperative opponents should try to determinewhether those people’s apparent predisposition toward cooperative interactions is consistent withtheir actual behavior. Is their own openness being reciprocated by opponent candor? Until theyverify this fact, they should not disclose excessive amounts of critical information regarding theirown situations. They might otherwise permit manipulative adversaries to create false impressions
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37 See JEFFREY RUBIN & BERT BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OFBARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION 185 (1975).
38 See id.; I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN & MAUREEN R.BERMAN, THE PRACTICALNEGOTIATOR 25 (1982).
of cooperation, so they can take advantage of one-sided disclosures by this side.36 If lawyers findthat their preliminary openness is not being reciprocated by their opponents, they should be lessforthcoming with their own important information to avoid exploitation by opportunistadversaries.Studies indicate that competitive individuals tend to behave competitively regardless ofthe behavior of their opponents, while cooperative persons tend to behave like those with whomthey interact – cooperatively with other cooperative parties and competitively with competitiveadversaries.37 This phenomenon is generated by the fact that cooperative individuals see theworld as composed of both cooperative and competitive persons, while competitive peoplebelieve that others usually behave in a competitive manner.38 Although cooperative negotiatorsprefer to interact with other cooperative persons, they recognize that when they confrontcompetitive opponents they must behave more strategically (i.e., less openly) to avoidexploitation.Some lawyers demonstrate overtly competitively tendencies at the outset of bargainingencounters. They deliberately create competitive office environments that are designed to maketheir opponents feel uncomfortable. Their furniture takes up most of their office, they givethemselves raised comfortable chairs, and they provide their opponents with short uncomfortable
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39 See BOB WOOLF, FRIENDLY PERSUASION 34-35 (1990). See generally RONALDM. SHAPIRO & MARK A. JANKOWSKI, THE POWER OF NICE (rev. ed. 2001).
40 See Clark Freshman, Adele Hayes & Greg Feldman, The Lawyer-Negotiator as MoodScientist: What We Know and Don’t Know About How Mood Relates to Successrul Negotiation,2002 J. DISP. RES. 13, 15 (2002); Leigh L. Thompson, Janice Nadler & Peter H. Kim, SomeLike It Hot: The Case for the Emotional Negotiator in SHARED COGNITION IN
chairs. When they have to negotiate in other offices, they select seats directly across from – rather than adjacent to – their opponents to create adversarial environments. They are likely to sitwith their arms folded across their chest, and exude minimal personal warmth.  They often referto adversaries as “Mr.” or “Ms.”             instead of by their first names, to permit them todepersonalize their interactions with people they psychologically view as their enemies.As lawyers begin the Preliminary Stage, they should take the time to develop somerapport with opposing counsel. Through warm eye contact and a pleasant demeanor, they canestablish a mutually supportable environment. This reduces the unproductive anxiety created byadversarial conduct. Negotiators should recognize that they can be forceful advocates withoutresorting to disagreeable tactics.39 Individuals who equate offensive behavior with effectivenegotiating strategy will be doubly disappointed – their professional interactions will beincreasingly unpleasant and they will find it more difficult to obtain optimal results for theirclients.The preliminary portion of bargaining encounters is critical, because the participantscreate the atmosphere that affects their entire bargaining transaction. Studies have found thatpersons who commence interactions in positive moods negotiate more cooperatively and aremore likely to use problem-solving efforts designed to maximize the joint returns achieved by theparticipants.40 On the other hand, people who begin their encounters in negative moods negotiate
24
ORGANIZATIONS: THE MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 142-44 (Leigh L. Thompson,John M. Levine & David M. Messick, eds.1999);  Joseph P. Forgas, On Feeling Good andGetting Your Way: Mood Effects on Negotiator Cognition and Bargaining Strategies, 74 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 565, 566-74 (1999).
41 See Clark Freshman, Adele Hayes & Greg Feldman, supra note 40, at 22-24; Leigh L.Thompson, Janice Nadler & Peter H. Kim, supra note 40, at 142-44.
42 See JEFFREY RUBIN & BERT BROWN, supra note 37, at 263. See generallyWILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO (1991).
more adversarially and tend to generate less efficient  results. In addition, while negative moodparticipants are more likely to resort to deceptive tactics than others, positive mood actors aremore likely to honor the agreements reached than their negative mood cohorts.41 It is thusbeneficial for individuals beginning bargaining encounters to take a few minutes to createsupportive environments designed to create positive moods that should make their interactionsmore pleasant and enhance the probability the parties will interact cooperatively and maximizetheir joint returns.Lawyers who have learned from previous personal dealings or from other reliable sourcesthat particular adversaries approach negotiations in a competitive manner should initially try todemonstrate their willingness to engage in mutually cooperative behavior. Although they shouldbe careful not to disclose too much significant information without receiving reciprocaldisclosures, evidence indicates that cooperative conduct promotes the development of trust andcontributes to the establishment of mutually supportive relationships.42Attorneys who meet professionally for the first time often engage in games of one-upmanship. Individuals from prestigious firms or prominent government agencies emphasizetheir office affiliations. Some people may mention the well-known law schools from which they
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43 See Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Student GPAs and a Pass/Fail Option on ClinicalNegotiation Course Performance, 15 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 373 (2000).
44 See HOWARD RAIFFA, supra note 7, at 300-01.
graduated. Individuals from less prestigious firms or less prominent law schools should not beintimidated by these types of disclosures. I have found no statistically significant correlationbetween student GPAs and their performance on my negotiation course exercises.43 I wouldsimilarly expect no correlation between the overall reputation of law schools and the negotiationskills of their graduates. Successful students have high abstract reasoning skills, while proficientnegotiators possess good interpersonal skills. Although the former capabilities help people gainadmission to top schools, they have a minimal impact on negotiation performance.Attorneys who encounter overtly competitive “win-lose” opponents should recognize thatwhile they may not be able to convert those individuals into cooperative “win-win” negotiators,they may be able to diminish the competitive tendencies of those persons. Through friendlyintroductions, sincere smiles, and warm handshakes, they can try to establish more personalrelationships. They can use a prolonged Preliminary Stage to enhance the negotiatingatmosphere. They can attempt to sit in cooperative, rather than competitive, configurations. Theycan ask these opponents about their families or their colleagues, while making similar disclosuresabout themselves. If they can establish first-name relationships, they can accentuate the personalnature of the impending interactions. If their preliminary efforts do not diminish the competitive behavior of opponents,lawyers may employ “attitudinal bargaining” to encourage more pleasant conduct.44 They mayindicate their unwillingness to view the bargaining process as a combative exercise, and suggest
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45 See HENRY S. KRAMER, GAME, SET, MATCH: WINNING THENEGOTIATIONS GAME 264-65 (2001); LEIGH STEINBERG, WINNING WITHINTEGRITY 144-49 (1998).
46 See generally Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Conscience, 77WASH. L. REV. 1121 (2002); Taryn Fuchs-Burnett, Mass Public Corporate Apology, 57 DISP.RES. J. 27 (2002); Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1009(1999).
the need to establish some preliminary ground rules for the interaction.45 Litigators can suggestthat if the other side prefers open hostility, a trial setting would be the appropriate forum due tothe presence of a presiding official. Transactional negotiators may indicate that their clients arelooking for mutually beneficial, on-going relationships that cannot be created and maintainedthrough untrusting adversarial behavior. When attitudinal bargaining fails to generate appropriate conduct, individuals who mustinteract with unpleasant opponents should try to control their encounters in ways that diminishthe ability of offensive participants to bother them. For example, against a sarcastic and belittlingopponent, they could use the telephone to conduct their discussions. When the other side’sbehavior begins to bother them, they can indicate that they have another call and break off talks.They can call back their adversary once they have calmed down.Legal representatives need to appreciate the benefits that may be derived at the outset of aconflict-resolution discussion from an acknowledgment of the other party’s plight and theissuance of a simple apology.46 Most people only resort to litigation after all other efforts toresolve matters have failed. By then, the aggrieved persons are frustrated and angry regarding theperceived unwillingness of the responsible parties to acknowledge their contribution to theproblem. If the seemingly responsible individuals indicate an appreciation of the injured party’s
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47 See Donna L. Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of the Twenty-First Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 829, 835-36 (2003); Deborah L. Levi, The Role ofApology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1172-75 (1997).
situation and state that they are sorry for what has befallen that party – without necessarilyadmitting legal responsibility – the aggrieved party may accept their expressions of sympathy andeither accept their fate alone or work constructively to generate mutually acceptable resolutions.Some people might suggest that an effective apology must include a clear admission ofresponsibility for the injuries suffered,47 but I have not found this to be true. If someone sincerelysympathizes with the loss suffered by the other side or acknowledges the basis for that side’snegative feelings, this act can significantly diminish the impact of those negative emotions, evenif the sympathizer does not acknowledge personal responsibility. This is because such behavioroften generates healing and forgiveness in the injured party, and allows that party to put theunderlying issues to rest. This can be especially beneficial when the disputing parties hope topreserve on-going relationships.
IV.   THE INFORMATION STAGE: VALUE CREATIONOnce the negotiators have established their identities and the tone for their interaction, thefirst substantive stage of the process begins. Lawyers can easily observe the commencement ofthe Information Stage, because this point coincides with a shift from small talk to questionsregarding the other side’s needs and interests. During this part of the process, the participantswork to determine the items available for joint distribution. They hope to discern the underlyinginterests and objectives of the other party. Proficient bargainers also look for ways to expand theoverall pie to be divided, recognizing that in most situations the parties do not value each of the
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50 See RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 12-13(2002); ABRAHAM P. ORDOVER & ANDREA DONEFF, ALTERNATIVES TOLITIGATION 20-22 (2002); JOHN ILICH, DEALBREAKERS AND BREAKTHROUGHS 68(1992).
items identically and oppositely. The more effectively the participants can expand the pie, themore efficiently they should be able to conclude their interaction.48A.  USE OF INFORMATION-SEEKI NG QUESTIONSThe optimal way to elicit information from opponents is to ask questions.49 During thepreliminary part of the Information Stage, many parties make the mistake of asking narrowquestions that can be answered with brief responses. As a result, they merely confirm what theyalready know. It is more effective to ask broad, open-ended information seeking questions thatinduce opponents to speak.50 The more they talk, the more information they directly andindirectly disclose. Lawyers who suspect something about a particular area should formulateseveral expansive inquiries pertaining to that area. The people being questioned usually assumethat the askers know more about their side’s circumstances than they actually do, and they tend toover answer the questions being asked, providing more information than they would have inresponse to specific questions. Only after negotiators have obtained a significant amount ofinformation should they begin to narrow their inquiries to confirm what they think they have
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53 See JOHN ILICH, THE ART AND SKILL OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION 142(1973).
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heard.51 If opponents attempt to avoid direct responses to these questions, to prevent thedisclosure of particular information, the questioners should reframe their inquiries in a way thatcompels definitive replies.52The interrogation process not only enables questioners to elicit opponent information, butmay also permit them to seize control over the early bargaining agenda.53 Effective questionerscan steer the discussions in the direction in which they wish to proceed, and avoid theexploration of issues they prefer to ignore. They can thus focus on the items they would like toobtain, while avoiding topics that may undermine their interests.Skilled negotiators actively listen and carefully observe opponents during the InformationStage.54 They maintain supportive eye contact to encourage further opponent disclosures and todiscern verbal leaks and nonverbal clues. They use smiles and occasional head nods to encourageadditional responses from adversaries who feel they are being heard. Active listeners not onlyhear what is being said, but recognize what is not being discussed, since they understand thatomitted topics may suggest weaknesses opponents do not wish to address.55
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Advocates should proceed slowly during the Information Stage, because it takes time forthe persons being questioned to decide what should be disclosed and when it should be divulged.Patient questioning and active listening are usually rewarded with the attainment of greaterknowledge. Too many negotiators rush through the Information Stage, because they can hardlywait to begin the distributive portion of interactions.56 When impatient bargainers conduct anabbreviated Information Stage, they usually miss important pieces of information and achieveagreements that are less beneficial than the accords they might have obtained through a moredeliberate questioning process.Since negotiators cannot impose their will on opponents, they must ascertain theunderlying needs and interests of those parties and seek to at least minimally satisfy the basicgoals of those participants. Through patient and strategically planned questioning, they can try tolearn as much as possible about opponent interests, objectives, and relative preferences. Whatissues would the other side like to have addressed, and which terms are essential, important, anddesirable? Which items do both sides consider essential or important, and which arecomplementary terms that can be exchanged in ways that simultaneously advance the goals ofboth parties?B.  BENEFITS OF INDUCING OPPONENTS TO MAKE FIRST OFFERSWhich side should make the initial offer, and does it make any difference who goes first?Some negotiators prefer to make the first offer because they think this approach allows them to
31
57 See LEIGH STEINBERG, supra note 45, at 52-53; JAMES C. FREUND, supra note27, at 114-15.
58 See ROGER DAWSON, supra note 17, at 18-20; Richard Birke & Craig R.Fox,Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 41(1999).
define the bargaining range and discourage wholly unrealistic opponent offers.57 Even individualswho often go first recognize the risks of making the initial offer if they are not certain of thevalue of the items being exchanged. The use of preemptive first offers can be an effectivetechnique when both sides have a realistic understanding of the items involved and haveestablished a trusting relationship. When such factors are not present, however, I prefer to elicitfirst offers from my opponents for three reasons.First, if one or both sides have miscalculated the value of the interaction, whoever goesfirst will disclose the misunderstanding and place themselves at a disadvantage. Even thoughproficient bargainers can frequently predict accurately the areas in which their adversaries willcommence the process, they can never be certain. Their opponents may have over-estimated thisside’s strengths or over-estimated their own weaknesses, and their preliminary offer is likely todisclose this error.A second reason to elicit first offers from the other side concerns a phenomenon knownas “bracketing.” If negotiators can induce their opponents to make the initial offers, they canbracket their goals by adjusting their own opening offers to keep their objectives near the mid-point between their respective opening positions.58 For example, if plaintiff attorneys hope toobtain $500,000 and defense counsel initially offer them $250,000, they can begin with a demandof $750,000 to keep their $500,000 target in the middle. Since parties tend to move toward the
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59 See ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING,COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING 493 (1990); HERBERT KRITZER, supra note 24, at 68.
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center of their opening positions, due to the accepted obligation of bargaining parties to makereciprocal concessions, the people who go second can manipulate the central point and placetheir adversaries at a psychological disadvantage.The third reason to induce opponents to make the initial offers concerns the fact thatnegotiators who make the first concessions tend to do less well than their adversaries.59 Peoplewho make the first concessions tend to be anxious negotiators who make more and largerconcessions than their opponents. Individuals who induce their adversaries to make the firstoffers have a good chance of persuading them the make the initial concessions. After theiropponents make the initial offer, this side’s opening position looks like a counter-offer. It is thuseasy for this side to look to the other side for the first concession.If anxious negotiators can be induced to make the first offers, adroit opponents may beable to induce them to “bid against themselves” by getting them to make consecutive andunreciprocated opening offers. The recipients of the other side’s initial offer can flinch and lookshocked by what they heard in an effort to get a less confident party to provide them with a moregenerous position statements.60 They may accomplish the same objective by looking at theopening offeror and telling that person “you’ll have to do better than that.”61It is not always easy to induce opponents to make the opening offers. In some situations,the usual business practices suggest that the party initiating the bargaining encounter should
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begin the substantive discussions. For example, someone who has decided to sell her businessmay be expected to propose a price, and a person initiating a law suit may be expected to indicatewhat he wishes to obtain.62 Despite this factor, skilled bargainers who might otherwise beexpected to initiate the process may be able to induce less proficient opponents to do so. Theymay prolong the Preliminary Stage discussions and the early portions of the Information Stageuntil a less patient adversary simply articulates the first offer to get the substantive talks moving.They might alternatively begin the Information Stage by asking the opponent a number ofquestions that lead to a request for an opening position statement.C.  MULTIPLE ITEM NEGOTIATIONSWhen numerous terms have to be negotiated, the participants have to ascertain the degreeto which each side values each item. They often obtain this information from the way in whichthe serious discussions commence. It is unwieldy to bargain over twenty-five or fifty itemssimultaneously. As a result, most negotiators begin the real talks with a group of four or fiveterms. They generally begin with a group of either important or unimportant items. Anxiousbargainers tend to start with a group of important items, thinking that if agreement can bereached on these terms the remaining issues should be resolvable. While this is true, it is alsorisky. When parties begin the substantive talks by focusing on the more important items, theyoften reach a quick impasse. The gap between the stated positions may seem immense, and theparticipants may conclude that no accord is possible. On the other hand, if parties begin with adiscussion of the less significant terms, they can quickly achieve tentative agreements withrespect to many of the issues to be addressed. As they reach agreement on twenty then forty and
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even sixty percent of the items to be covered, they emphasize the areas for joint gain and becomepsychologically committed to settlement.63 As they approach the more controverted terms, theyremember the success they have already achieved and do not want to allow the remaining itemsto prevent an overall accord.64 In addition, the final items no longer seem as insurmountable asthey would have if the parties had begun their discussions with those terms.When the initial groups of items are raised, an active listener can learn a lot from the wayin which the opponent begins the talks. If the adversary begins with a group of five items, four ofwhich this side values and one of which it does not, most likely the other side values all fiveitems. This side can try to trade the term it does not prefer for one of the other four it wishes toobtain. On the other hand, the opponent may begin with four unimportant items and onesignificant term. This would indicate that the adversary probably does not value any of theseissues. This side may be able to trade the item it values for one or two of the other terms of littlevalue without the other party realizing what it has given up.D.  HOW TO DISCLOSE AND WITHHOLD IMPORTANT INFORMATIONWhile individuals prepare for a negotiation, they must decide several things regardingtheir own side’s information. What information are they willing to disclose, and how do theyplan to divulge it? What sensitive information do they wish to withhold, and how do they plan toavoid the disclosure of these facts? People who resolve these crucial issues before they begin tointeract with their opponents are more likely to have successful Information Stages than those
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persons who do not think about these issues until they are forced to do so during the actualnegotiations.If the negotiation process is to develop in an efficacious manner, both sides have toengage in an information exchange. Some people consider this a straight-forward part of theinteraction and see no need to employ manipulative tactics. Once the Information Stage begins,they directly tell their opponents what they wish to obtain and why they want those terms. Theyexpect their candor to be reciprocated. They may be disappointed by competitive opponents whotake advantage of this openness to obtain better terms for themselves.65Negotiators who readily volunteer their critical information may encounter additionaldifficulties. As they naively disclose their interests and objectives, their statements may not beheard by opponents who are not listening intently to such statements. In addition, whenadversaries do hear the information being disclosed, they tend to discredit it because of “reactivedevaluation.”66 They assume the disclosures are manipulative and self-serving, and they discountmuch of what they hear.Bargainers who want their important information to be heard and respected shoulddisclose that information slowly in response to opponent questions.  When they answer opponentinquiries with such disclosures, their adversaries hear more of what they are saying becausepeople listen more intently to the answers to their own questions. In addition, opponents attributethese disclosures to their question capabilities and accord what they hear greater respect. 
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When individuals indicate the items they would like to obtain through the negotiationprocess, they should do so through principled position statements. They should provide succinctrationales explaining why they think they deserve the terms they are requesting. This approachinduces opponents to treat their position statements seriously, and it makes it difficult foradversaries to summarily dismiss their offers.67What should negotiators do when opponents ask them about areas they would prefer notto address? They should appreciate the fact that it is much easier to avoid the disclosure ofimportant information if their adversaries are unaware of the fact that knowledge is beingwithheld. The most effective way to accomplish this objective is through the use of “blockingtechniques.”68 These tactics are regularly employed by politicians who do not wish to provideanswers to sensitive questions that may cost them votes no matter how they respond. People wholisten carefully to such politicians will be amazed by the number of inquiries that go unanswered.The first blocking technique involves ignoring the question being asked. Negotiators whodo not like a particular inquiry should continue the current conversation or change the discussionto other topics they would prefer to explore as if they never heard the question that waspropounded. If they can get their opponents caught up in their continued talks, those persons mayforget to restate their initial inquiry.Someone being asked a three or four part question can focus on the part she likes andignore the rest. If she can induce her opponent to focus on the part being addressed, he may never
37return to the other parts of the initial inquiry. A person being asked a delicate question may overor under answer it. If he is asked a specific question, he can provide a general response. If asked ageneral inquiry, he can give a narrow response. He might alternatively misinterpret the questionbeing asked. An opponent asks about a particular topic, and he responds by indicating that theopponent must be concerned about a different subject. He then steers the discussion in thedirection he would like to see it progress. If he can induce his adversary to focus on the new areabeing discussed, that person may fail to restate the original inquiry.Questions occasionally seek information of a confidential or privileged nature. Theperson asking these questions hopes to catch the respondent off guard and induce that person toprovide an answer. When negotiators commence bargaining interactions, they should determinewhat information they are not willing to disclose. What information concerns confidentiallawyer-client communications? What information is privileged (e.g., attorney work product)?They should be prepared to respond to opponent inquiries pertaining to these areas by indicatingthat they concern confidential or privileged matters they are not willing to discuss. Onceadversaries realize they are not going to answer these questions, those persons will move on toother areas.E.  EXPLORING UNDERLYING NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF PARTIESWhen an expansive settlement range exists between the bottom lines of the two sides, theparticipants should be able to achieve accords. Their resulting agreement, however, will probablynot be a Pareto superior solution – where neither party could enhance its present circumstanceswithout simultaneously worsening the other side’s situation. If the parties can thoughtfullyexplore their respective underlying interests and rely upon objective standards to guide their
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69 The use of integrative bargaining techniques to maximize the joint returns achieved bythe negotiating parties will be discussed in connection with the Cooperative Stage, infra. If theparties fail to explore their underlying interests and needs during the Information Stage, it makesit less likely that they will be able to make the exchanges during the subsequent CooperativeStage that will generate efficient results.
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71 See HOWARD RAIFFA, supra note 7, at 198-201; ROBERT M. MNOOKIN, SCOTTR. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, supra note 478 at 11-44; Carrie Menkel-Meadow,Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L.REV. 754, 813 (1984); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, supra note 9, at 41-57.
discussions, they should be able to expand the overall pie and enhance the benefits to bothsides.69 Although many legal practitioners consider the negotiation process an inherentlyadversarial endeavor, they should appreciate the benefits that may be derived during theInformation Stage from the use of nonadversarial questioning techniques. Too many bargainersmake the mistake of assuming that the parties have a fixed amount of goods to be divided – i.e.,identical value systems and analogous utility functions that generate zero-sum transactions.70 Ifthey replaced leading questions, intended to challenge the positions being taken by opponents,with more neutral questions designed to elicit the underlying needs and interests of the other side,the negotiators could more easily look for areas that would allow joint gains.71Even entirely monetary transactions do not have to be regarded as zero-sum endeavors.The two sides may have quite different preference curves with respect to the value of money. Inaddition, through the use of in-kind payments consisting of goods or services, the parties mayconvert their interaction into a non-zero-sum transaction. A purchaser of a company may agree to
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provide $50 million in cash and $15 million in goods or services. The seller believes she just soldher firm for $65 million, while the purchaser thinks he only paid $59 million, because it only cost$9 million to generate the goods and services valued by the seller for $15 million. The partiesmay alternatively provide for some future payments that may be considered beneficial by bothsides. People involved with multi-item negotiations must appreciate the fact that the partiesprobably value the various items quite differently. This enables them to look for exchanges thatcan simultaneously benefit both sides.72 For example, individuals negotiating the terms for amarital dissolution may be discussing their primary residence and vacation home, their SUV andsports car, custody of their two young children, child support payments, and possible alimony.They may be arguing over joint custody, when only one spouse really wants primary parentingresponsibilities. If the spouse who does not strongly desire primary parenting obligations isprovided with adequate visitation rights, he or she may provide the other person with the primaryresidence in which to continue living with the children and the SUV needed to transport thechildren, in exchange for the vacation home and the sports car. They can then talk about childsupport payments and possible alimony.If negotiators hope to expand the overall pie and ultimately explore beneficial exchangesthat may simultaneously benefit both sides, they must initially classify the goals sought by theirrespective sides as “essential, “ ”important,” and “desirable.” They must then endeavor todetermine during their information exchanges the degree to which their own side’s goals conflict
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with the objectives of the other side.73 In some instances, both parties may actually desire theidentical distribution of the items in question (“shared needs”), allowing them to enhance theirrespective interests at the same time. In other situations, each may wish to attain independentobjectives that do not conflict with the interests of their opponent (“independent needs”). In onlysome areas do both parties wish to claim the identical items for themselves. Even with respect tothese “conflicting needs” the two sides must ascertain the degree to which each prefers the termsin question. One may consider them “essential,” while the other may only regard them as“important” or “desirable.” The party with a higher preference should be willing to trade terms oflesser value to obtain the items they prefer to get. Only when the parties both value conflictingneeds identically are both going to vie for them. In these areas, even trades of similarly valuedterms can move the parties toward final accords.
V.   THE DISTRIBUTIVE STAGE: VALUE CLAIMINGThe transition from the Information Stage to the Distributive Stage is usually visible. Theparticipants cease asking each other what they want and why they want it, and begin to talk aboutwhat they have to have or are willing to give up. During the Information Stage the focus isprimarily upon opponents, as the negotiators try to ascertain what is available for distribution anddetermine the degree to which the other party values the items to be exchanged. During theDistributive Stage, the focus is on our own sides as we – and our adversaries – begin to claim theitems we discovered during the previous stage. 
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No matter how much altruistic negotiators try to create win-win bargaining environments,there will always be items both sides wish to obtain. Most proficient legal representatives hope toclaim more of the conflicted terms for their own clients. In their book The Power of NIce, RonShapiro and Mark Jankowski unambiguously articulate this philosophy: “[W]e’re out to achieveall (or most) of our goals, to make our most desirable deal. But the best way to do so is to let theother side achieve some of their goals, to make their acceptable deal. That’s WIN-win: big winfor your side, little win for theirs.” 74 Throughout the Distributive Stage, the parties compete forthese mutually desired terms.Legal negotiators rarely endeavor to divide up the available items in an egalitarian manner,because there are seldom truly objective standards that can be employed to determine what eachside “deserves” to receive.75 Negotiators rarely possess equal bargaining power and identicalbargaining proficiency, and the participants with greater strength and skill should be able to obtainmore beneficial results than their weaker opponents. In addition, the parties are likely to value thevarious items differently, precluding any really detached comparison of the terms received byeach.76
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79 See SAMFRTIS LePOOLE, supra note 10, at 72.
A.  CAREFULLY PLANNED CONCESSION PATTERNSPersuasive bargainers begin the Distributive Stage with the articulation of “principled”positions that rationally explain why they deserve what they are offering or seeking. This bolsterstheir confidence in their own positions, and undermines the confidence of less prepared opponentsin their own positions. Proficient negotiators also begin with carefully prepared concessionpatterns.77 They know how they plan to move from their opening offers to their final objectives.They may intend to make several deliberate, but expansive, concessions, or prefer to employ aseries of incremental position changes. They know that this aspect of their strategy must bethoughtfully choreographed to maximize their bargaining effectiveness. They try to make only“principled” concessions that they can rationally explain to their adversaries. This lets othersknow why they are making the precise position change being articulated, and indicates why agreater modification is not presently warranted. This approach also helps them to remain at theirnew position until they obtain a reciprocal concession from the other side.The timing of concessions is important. Many anxious negotiators find it difficult to copewith the uncertainty indigenous to the bargaining process, and they often make rapid – andoccasionally unreciprocated – concessions in a desperate effort to generate accords. They ignorethe fact that 80 percent of position changes tend to occur during the last 20 percent of interactions.78  People who attempt to expedite transactions in an artificial manner usually pay ahigh price for their impatience.79
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Concessions must be carefully formulated and tactically announced. If properly used, aposition change can signal a cooperative attitude; it can also communicate the need for acounteroffer if the opponent intends to continue the bargaining process. If carelessly issued,however, a concession can signal anxiety and a loss of control. This may occur when a positionchange is announced in a tentative and unprincipled manner by an individual who continues totalk nervously and defensively after the concession has been articulated. Such behavior suggeststhat the speaker does not expect immediate reciprocity from the other side. When one encounterssuch individuals, they should subtly encourage them to keep talking, since this approach maygenerate additional, unanswered concessions.80 To avoid this problem, proficient negotiatorsannounce their position changes with appropriate explanations, then shift the focus to theiropponents. By exuding a patient silence at this point, they indicate that reciprocal behavior mustbe forthcoming if the interaction is to continue.Professor Jeffrey Hartje has suggested that a concession should emerge in a four-partprocess:(1) A well reasoned, carefully justified relinquishment of a previous position.(2) The arrival at a new bargaining point to which the negotiator is committed for reasonsof principle, fairness, cost, precedent, logic, client direction, lack of authority, and so forth.(3) An extraction, on the basis of the spirit of compromise and good faith bargaining, of acounter concession with a willingness to entertain further discussion.(4) Any concession and a new commitment point should be articulated in the language of
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81 Jeffrey H. Hartje, Lawyer’s Skills in Negotiations: Justice in Unseen Hands, 1984 MO.J. DISP. RES. 119, 167 (1984).
82 See ANTHONY R. PRATKANIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, supra note 29, at 180-81.
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the parties’ needs or interests rather than some mechanical position or posture.81The exact amount and precise timing of each position change are critical. Each successiveconcession should be smaller than the preceding one, and each should normally be made inresponse to an appropriate counteroffer from the opponent. If a subsequent change is greater thanthe prior ones, this may signal that the conceding party is adrift. If successive concessions aremade too quickly, this may similarly indicate a lack of control. Following each change, the focusshould be shifted to the other side. Patient silence will let the other party know that they mustreciprocate to keep the process moving.82Although negotiators should carefully plan their concession patterns in advance, they mustremain flexible in recognition of the fact that opponents do not always react to position changes asinitially expected. Participants must thus be prepared to change their planned behavior as newinformation regarding adversary strengths, weaknesses, and preferences is obtained.83 They shouldnot only be prepared to adjust their aspiration level, when appropriate, but also be ready to altertheir concession strategy based upon mutually acknowledged objective criteria.84 They must bepatient, recognizing that a particular interaction may take longer to complete than they originallyanticipated. When concessions are small and the issues are numerous and/or complex, negotiatorsmust allow the process to develop deliberately. If they try to hasten the transaction in an unnatural
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way, they may place themselves at a tactical disadvantage.85Negotiators should always remember their nonsettlement options and preliminarilyestablished resistence points as they approach their bottom lines during bargaining interactions.They must recognize the fact that it would be irrational to accept proposed terms that are lessbeneficial than their external alternatives. As the Distributive Stage unfolds and they approachtheir resistence points, many advocates feel greater pressure to settle, when they should actuallyfeel less pressure to achieve accords. When the terms being offered by opponents are not muchbetter than their nonsettlement options, participants approaching their bottom lines possess more –not less – bargaining power than the offerors. They have little to lose if no agreements areachieved, thus they should not be afraid to reject the disadvantageous proposals on the table.Instead of exuding weakness, as many negotiators do in these circumstances, they should projectstrength. Since their opponents are likely to lose more than they lose from nonsettlements, theycan confidently demand further concessions as a prerequisite to any final accord.As the Distributive Stage develops, the parties frequently encounter temporary impasses.The participants are attempting to obtain optimal terms for their respective clients, and each ishoping to induce the other to make the next position change. Individuals who have viable externaloptions should not hesitate to disclose – at least minimally – this critical fact. The more theiradversaries know about these alternatives, the more likely they are to appreciate the need for moreaccommodating behavior. It is usually most effective to convey this information in a calm andnon-confrontational manner.86 Bargainers who refuse to divulge the scope of their nonsettlement
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87 See generally Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: EmpiricalEvidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143 (2002). Inher empirical study of attorneys in Milwaukee and Chicago, Professor Schneider found that while54 percent of cooperative/problem-solving lawyers were considered by their peers to be effectivenegotiators, only 9 percent of competitive/adversarial bargainers were viewed as effective. Id. at167. On the other hand, while only 3.5 percent of cooperative/problem-solving negotiators wererated ineffective, 53.3 percent of competitive/adversarial bargaainers were.
88 See DONALD GIFFORD, supra note 52, at 16-18.
89 See MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEAL, NEGOTIATINGRATIONALLY 90-95 (1992).
options at critical points often fail to achieve accords that may have been attainable had theiradversaries been fully aware of their actual circumstances.Despite the competitive nature of distributive bargaining, a cooperative/problem-solvingapproach is more likely to produce beneficial results than a competitive/adversarial strategy.87 Theformer style permits the participants to explore the opportunity for mutual gain in a relativelyobjective and detached manner.88 The latter approach, however, is more likely to generate mistrustand an unwillingness of the negotiators to share sensitive information.When specific offers are met with unreceptive responses, negotiators can employ theirquestioning skills to direct the attention of opponents toward the areas that may generate jointgains. This may enable them to elicit information from their adversaries regarding their underlyinginterests and goals.89 As they obtain helpful insights pertaining to the other side’s value system,they should divulge information concerning their own side’s objectives. This approach maypermit the parties to generate a minimal degree of trust and encourage the participants to employ aproblem-solving approach.No matter how effectively negotiators have been interacting, they occasionally find
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themselves moving toward an impasse. Before they permit an impending stalemate to precludefurther talks, they should consider other options that may enable them to keep the processmoving.90 They may reframe especially emotional issues in an effort to find more neutral languagethat may be more acceptable to both sides.  They may temporarily change the focus of theirdiscussions, ceasing to talk about the issues on which they have been concentrating and moving toother issues that may regenerate stalled discussions. They may briefly talk about recent politicalevents, sports, weather, mutual acquaintances, or similar topics, hoping to relieve their bargainingtension. It can be helpful to recount a humorous story that will humanize the participants andremind them not to take the current circumstances too seriously.Some negotiators try to prevent impasses by changing their bargaining environments. Theymay rearrange the furniture into a more cooperative configuration. They may alternatively moveto another location, hoping that a change of scenery may induce altered behavior. On someoccasions, the participants may determine that negotiator personalities have createdcommunication difficulties. When this occurs, they may consider a change in bargaining teamcompositions. If new people are brought in, they may be able to regenerate stalled talks bothbecause of the absence of prior interpersonal conflicts and the introduction of new ideas.Parties encountering bargaining difficulties may request the assistance of a mediator. Sucha neutral facilitator can often reopen blocked communication channels and induce the negotiatorsto reframe emotional issues and refocus their efforts on less controverted items they have beenignoring. If the mediator can get the parties to explore areas for joint gains, their temporaryimpasse may be broken. When they return to the issues on which they were fighting, both sides
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may be less contentious because of the progress they have made on other less conflicted terms.When the bargaining atmosphere becomes unusually tense, it may be beneficial for theparties to take a break to allow themselves to cool off and reconsider their positions. They shouldcarefully review their nonsettlement alternatives and contemplate unexplored bargaining optionsthat may enable them to expand the pie and generate better joint agreements. Before they recessthe talks, however, they should set a firm date for their next session. If they fail to do this, eachmay be hesitant to contact the other lest they appear weak. B.  POWER BARGAININGThe Distributive Stage generally involves some degree of power bargaining, as theparticipants attempt to obtain optimal results for their respective clients concerning the items bothsides value.91 The purpose of this approach is to induce opponents to think they have to providemore generous terms than they actually have to provide. This objective may be accomplished byinducing those persons to reassess their own situations. Have operative weaknesses been ignoredor inappropriately minimized? Have their strengths been over-estimated? Negotiators may expandtheir own power by convincing adversaries that they possess greater strength or less vulnerabilitythan their opponents think they do.92 They may casually mention possible nonsettlement optionstheir opponents may not think are available to them, or suggest ways they can avoid negativeconsequences the other side thinks they will suffer if accords are not achieved.Self assurance is one of the most important attributes possessed by successful negotiators.
49They exude an inner confidence in their positions, and always appear to be in control of thesituation. They do not appear to fear the possibility of nonsettlements, suggesting to opponentsthat they have developed alternatives that will protect their clients if the current negotiations areunproductive. These factors cause less certain adversaries to accord these persons more power andrespect than they objectively deserve.Proficient bargainers always commence their interactions with high and well supportedaspiration levels, while less skilled negotiators often begin with deflated goals, fearing that theirinitial demands may engender hostility if they are not modest. The confidence exhibited by themore prepared negotiators with higher aspirations frequently causes less prepared bargainers withlower goals to doubt the propriety of their minimal objectives. They assume the high goalparticipants possess beneficial nonsettlement alternatives, and accord them greater respect thanthey deserve.Negotiators must appreciate the fact that there is no such thing as actual bargaining power,but merely the parties’ perceptions of it. If participants accord their opponents greater authoritybecause of the confidence exuded by those persons, the effective power possessed by those peopleexpands greatly. Their demands are likely to be met by the participants who assume that their ownnonsettlement alternatives are worse than those possessed by the more certain negotiators. Beforethese uncertain individuals make excessive concessions, they need to reassess the actualcircumstances. They should carefully review their own nonsettlement alternatives, and thenestimate what would be likely to happen to their opponents if no accords were achieved. Anobjective reappraisal may convince them that they possess more power than they initially thought.
50
93 See GERALD WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 79-81(1983).
94 See Robert Condlin, Cases on Both Sides: Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute-Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REV. 65, 73 (1985).
95 See RICHARD SHELL, supra note 19, at 104-05.
C.  COMMON POWER BARGAINING TACTICSDuring the Distributive Stage, the participants employ various techniques to advance theirinterests. Some are used in isolation, while others are employed simultaneously. These tactics aregenerally designed to keep opponents off balance and to induce them to think they have to makegreater concessions if the bargaining process is to continue. Negotiators should carefully plan theirown techniques, and anticipate and prepare for the tactics they think the other side will use.(1) ArgumentThe negotiating tactic employed most frequently by lawyers involves legal and nonlegalargument.93 When the facts support their positions, they emphasize the factual aspects of thetransaction. When legal doctrines support their claim, they cite statutes, regulations, judicialdecisions, and scholarly publications. Public policy may be cited when it advances clientpositions. When appropriate, economic and/or political considerations will be used.Negotiators do not really use arguments to elucidate, but rather to convince opponents togive them what they wish to achieve.94  Persuasive advocates are persons who are able to provideadversaries with seemingly valid reasons to provide them with their objectives. They employapparently objective standards to bolster their claims. They also frame the issues to be resolved inways that lend moral support to their own positions.95 Individuals with greater bargaining powertend to argue in favor of equitable distributions that favor their own side, while persons with less
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97 See ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, supra note 59, at 437-38.
98 See id. at 435-37.  
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power tend to argue for egalitarian distributions.96Persuasive arguments have to be presented in a relatively even-handed and objectivemanner if they are to appeal to opposing parties.97 They are most effective when presented in alogical and orderly sequence that will have a cumulative impact upon the recipients. Instead ofmerely restating arguments, speakers should restate them in different forms that are designed toenhance their persuasiveness.Proficient bargainers work to develop innovative arguments they hope have not beenanticipated by opponents. Once adversaries are forced to internally question their previouslydeveloped rationales supporting their own positions, they begin to suffer a loss of bargainingconfidence.  The weakening of their underlying positional foundations causes them to seriouslyconsider the legal and factual interpretations being offered by their adversaries.Effective assertions should be presented in a comprehensive, rather than conclusionary,manner.98 Relevant factual and legal information should be disclosed with appropriate detail toenhance the credibility of the assertions being advanced. Negotiators who ignore this factor willfrequently be challenged by effective counter arguments challenging the factual and/or legalassumptions underlying their conclusionary presentations.Lawyers should not ignore the potential persuasiveness of well-crafted emotionalappeals.99 While most attorneys are intelligent people who can easily counter logical assertions,
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they often find it difficult to ignore emotional presentations that generate guilt or compassion.Advocates should thus formulate arguments that are designed to elicit emotional responses,because these appeals may produce beneficial results.(2) Threats, Warnings, and PromisesAlmost all legal negotiations involve the use of overt or implicit threats.  Transactionalnegotiators indicate that they will deal with other parties if this side does not sweeten its offer,while litigators suggest that they will resort to adjudications if they do not get what they want atthe bargaining table. Threats are employed to convince opponents that the cost of disagreeing withproposed offers transcends the cost of acquiescence.100Less confrontational negotiators try to avoid the use of formal “threats,” preferring to useless challenging “warnings.” Instead of threatening to personally impose negative consequenceson their opponents if they do not change their positions, these people caution their adversariesabout the consequences that will naturally result from their failure to accept mutual accords.101These “warnings” do not concern action that the declarants plan to take, but events that willindependently evolve if no settlements are achieved. The negative effects may be imposed byabsent clients, judges, or the market place.When adverse consequences are likely to occur, it is usually beneficial to articulate the
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negative possibilities as “warnings” rather than “threats.”102 Threats are direct affronts toopponents and often induce reciprocal behavior; warnings are more indirect, based on what a thirdparty will do, making such warnings more palatable to listeners.103 In addition, the warning deviceenhances the credibility of the negative consequences being discussed, since the speakers aresuggesting that the adverse effects will result from the actions of third parties over whom theyexert minimal or no control.At the opposite end of the spectrum from negative threats and warnings are affirmative“promises.”104 A “promise” does not involve the suggestion of negative consequences, but ratherconsists of “an expressed intention to behave in a way that appears beneficial to the interests ofanother.”105  For example, instead of threatening legal action if an opponent does not alter hercurrent position, a negotiator indicates that if the other side provides a more generous offer, hewill respond with a better offer of his own. The affirmative promise provides a face-saving wayfor opposing sides to move jointly toward each other, because it promises reciprocal action inresponse to a change by the other party.Threats, warnings, and promises convey significant information concerning thetransmitter’s perception of the opponent’s circumstances. Threats and warnings disclose what the
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threatening side thinks the listener fears, while promises indicate what the promisor believes therecipient hopes to obtain. People given threats, warnings, or promises may be able to use thesetactics to their own advantage. If, for example, if an adversary suggests through a threat orwarning that she believes that this side would lose more from a nonsettlement than it wouldactually lose, it may be beneficial to disabuse the threatener of this misperception to prevent herfrom over-estimating this side’s need to reach an agreement. Conversely, if the other side appearsto desire a particular item for his client that is not valued by this side, an adroit negotiator can tryto extract some other meaningful term in exchange for this item. Proficient negotiators tend to transmit affirmative promises more frequently than they donegative threats or warnings.106 This surprises many bargainers, because most people rememberdisruptive threats and warnings more than face-saving promises, causing them to over-estimatethe number of threats and warnings they encountered. The use of promises increases thelikelihood of mutual accords, while the use of threats and warnings reduces this probability.107Negotiators who plan to employ threats to advance their agendas should appreciate thecharacteristics of effective threats. The proposed negative consequences must be carefullycommunicated to opponents, and the threatened result must be proportionate to the action the useris seeking. Insignificant threats are ignored as irrelevant, while excessive threats are dismissed asirrational.108 In addition, bargainers should never issue ultimatums they are not prepared to
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effectuate, because if their bluffs are called and they back down, their credibility is lost.109Negotiators who are threatened with negative consequences if they do not change theircurrent positions must always consider a critical factor. What is likely to happen to their side if noagreement is reached with the other side? If their external alternatives are preferable to whatwould be the result if they acceded to their opponent’s threat, they should not be afraid tomaintain their present positions. If they wish to preserve a positive bargaining atmosphere, hopingthat continued discussions will cause their adversaries to move in their direction, they can simplyignore the threat.110 If they behave as if no ultimatum has been issued, the other side may be ableto withdraw the threat without suffering a loss of face.(3)   Ridicule and HumorHumor can be used by people during the Preliminary Stage of the bargaining process tohelp them create more positive environments. Studies indicate that the use of humor can increasethe likability of the communicators.111 This approach can help negotiators develop more open andtrusting relationships with opponents. Humor may also be employed during the Distributive Stageto induce adversaries to accept proposals they might otherwise be hesitant to accept.112 Whennegotiations become unusually tense, a one-liner can remind the other side that the parties shouldnot be taking the situation so seriously. 
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Ridicule and humor can be employed by negotiators to indicate negative responses to poorproposals. For example, a derisive smile or sarcastic laughter may be used in response to anespecially one-sided offer to demonstrate how unacceptable it is. If employed skillfully, thisapproach may embarrass an opponent and induce that person to make another more reasonableoffer. If used less proficiently, such behavior may anger the other side and create an unproductiveenvironment.Some individuals use humor to disparage opponent offers without offending the offerors.In response to an extreme demand, they may ask, with a smile, if the other party also would like toobtain their first born child or a quit claim deed to Mars. This tactic may disconcert the personwho just made the demand, because he may not be sure whether this respondent is serious orkidding. A similar approach may be used by someone who has to raise a delicate subject that mayoffend the opponent. If they raise it in a jocular manner, their adversary may not be sure theymeant what they just communicated. This may soften the impact on the person affected.(4) SilenceSilence is an extremely effective bargaining tactic often overlooked by negotiators.113   Only the amateur fears to be silent for a moment lest interest lag. He dependssolely on words to capture attention. The artful performer knows that rhythmpatterns require silence too, and nothing is more dramatic and effective than along motionless pause after a statement. It permits absorption of the thought.It permits reflection. But more important, it compels attention to what has beensaid as if an italicized finger had been pointed at it.114Less competent negotiators fear silence. They are afraid that if they stop talking, they will
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lose control of the interaction. They remember the awkwardness they have experienced in socialsettings during prolonged pauses, and they feel compelled to speak. When they prattle on, theytend to disclose, both verbally and nonverbally, information they did not intend to divulge, andthey frequently make unintended concessions.115 When confronted by further silence fromadversaries, they continue their verbal leakage and concomitant loss of control.When negotiators have something important to convey, they should succinctly say whatthey have to say and become silent. There is no need to emphasize the point with unnecessaryreiteration. They need to give their listener the chance to absorb what has been said.116 Thisapproach is especially critical when concessions are being exchanged. Bargainers should articulatetheir new positions and quietly and patiently await responses from the receiving parties. If theprolonged silence makes them feel uncomfortable, they should review their notes or look out thewindow. Their calm patience indicates to the other side that they expect a response before theycontinue the discussions.Negotiators who encounter impatient opponents who exhibit an inability to remain silentshould use extended pauses to their own advantage. After talkative adversaries make positionchanges, they may become disconcerted if they receive no responses. As their anxiety increases,they may be induced to say more and even bid against themselves through the articulation ofunreciprocated concessions.
58(5) PatiencePersons involved in bargaining interactions must appreciate the fact the process takes timeto unfold.  Individuals who seek to accelerate developments usually obtain less favorable and lessefficient results than they would have attained had they been more patient. Offers that would havebeen acceptable if conveyed during the latter stages of a negotiation may not be attractive whenconveyed prematurely. The participants have not had sufficient time to appreciate the fact that anegotiated deal is preferable to their external alternatives.All negotiators experience some anxiety created by the uncertainty that is inherent inbargaining encounters. Individuals who can control the tension they experience and exude a quietconfidence are generally able to achieve better deals than less patient persons. They exhibit astamina that indicates that they are prepared to take as long as necessary to attain their objectives.Less patient opponents often give in, because they are unwilling to take the time they have toexpend to generate better results for their own side.Negotiators who hope to use their own stamina to wear down less patient adversariesshould develop pleasant styles that help them keep the process going when circumstances becomedifficult. If the bargaining environment becomes unusually tense, they might use short breaks toalleviate the tension. If they can convince their opponents that they will continue the process untilthey achieve their goals, they will frequently obtain capitulations from less committed adversaries.(6)   Guilt, Embarrassment, and IndebtednessSome negotiators seek to create feelings of guilt or embarrassment in opponents for thepurpose of inducing those persons to accede to their demands. They cite insignificanttransgressions, such as someone showing up late for a meeting or forgetting to bring an
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unimportant document, hoping to disconcert adversaries. They wish to make the others feel souncomfortable that they will try to regain social acceptability by doing something nice for them.When someone tries to place a bargaining participant at a disadvantage over a small oversight,they should simply apologize and move on without feeling the need to give up something ofsubstance.(7)   Voice and LanguageSome negotiators are afraid to raise their voices during interactions for fear of offendingopponents. They fail to appreciate the beneficial impact that can be achieved through the strategicuse of loudness. Controlled voice volume can be a characteristic of persuasiveness. Whenindividuals talk in a louder voice, others tend to listen. So long as the raised voice is not viewed asinappropriately aggressive or offensive, it does not hurt to speak more loudly when someonereally wants to be heard.Many persons think they will be more persuasive negotiators if they use more intenselanguage during their interactions. Studies show, however, that low intensity discussions are likelyto be more persuasive than high intensity presentations.117 This seeming anomaly is due to thenegative reaction most negotiators have toward high intensity persuasive efforts. High intensityspeakers seem  manipulative and offensive, while low intensity presenters tend to induceopponents to be less suspicious of and more receptive to their entreaties.
C.  NEGOTIATORS MUST REMEMBER THEIR NONSETTLEMENT OPTIONSThroughout the Distributive Stage, negotiators should always remember their current
60nonsettlement alternatives. It is no longer relevant what they were six months or a year ago, whenthese individuals began to prepare for the present interaction. The passage of time has generallyaffected the options that were previously available. The discovery process may have strengthenedor weakened the case of litigators, while changes in the business market may have influenced thevalue of the transaction being discussed. Has the market improved the situation of the firm beingpurchased or sold? Are the technology rights being licensed worth more or less than they were ayear ago?If bargainers fail to appreciate changes in the value of the present interactions, they mayenter into arrangements that are not better than what they would have had with no agreement.They must always remember that bad deals are worse than no deals. When nonsettlementalternatives are presently more beneficial than the terms being offered at the bargaining table, theyshould not hesitate to walk away from the current discussions. They should do this as pleasantlyas possible, for two reasons. First, when their opponents realize that they are really willing to endthe interaction, their adversaries may reconsider their positions and offer them more beneficialterms. Second, even if the current negotiations fail to regenerate and no accord is achieved, theparties may see each other in the future. If they remember these talks favorably, even if they werenot successful, future negotiations are likely to progress more smoothly than if these talks endedon an unpleasant note.
VI.  THE CLOSING STAGE: VALUE SOLIDIFYINGNear the end of the Distributive Stage, the participants realize that a mutual accord islikely to be achieved. They feel a sense of relief, because the anxiety generated by the uncertainty
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of the negotiation process is about to be alleviated by the attainment of a definitive agreement.Careful observers can often see signs of relief around the mouths of the negotiators, and they mayexhibit more relaxed postures. As the bargainers become psychologically committed to settlement,they may move too quickly toward the conclusion of the transaction.The Closing Stage represents a critical part of the bargaining process. The majority ofconcessions tend to be made during the concluding portion of negotiations,118 and overly anxiousparticipants may forfeit much of what they obtained during the Distributive Stage if they are notcareful. They must remain patient and allow the Closing Stage to develop in a deliberate fashion.Less successful negotiators tend to make excessive and unreciprocated concessions duringthe Closing Stage in an effort to guarantee final agreements. When they are asked about thisbehavior, they usually indicate that they did not want to risk the possibility of nonsettlements atthis stage of the process. They suggest that the accords they achieved were better for their clientsthan the results of no accords. When asked how interested their opponents were in finalagreements, they seem dumbfounded. They completely ignored this critical factor.By the conclusion of the Distributive Stage, both sides have become psychologicallycommitted to a joint resolution. Neither wants their prior bargaining efforts to culminate infailure. Less proficient negotiators focus almost entirely on their own side’s desire for anagreement, completely disregarding the settlement pressure affecting their opponents.As the Closing Stage commences, both sides want an agreement. It is thus appropriate forboth parties to expect joint movement toward final terms. Negotiators should be careful not tomake unreciprocated concessions, and to avoid excessive position changes. They should only
62contemplate larger concessions than their adversaries when their opponents have been moreaccommodating during the earlier exchanges and the verbal and nonverbal signals emanating fromthose participants indicate that they are approaching their resistance points.The Closing Stage is not a time for swift action; it is a time for patient perseverance.Negotiators should continue to employ the tactics that got them to this point, and they should bewell aware of their prior and present concession patterns. They should endeavor to make smaller,and, if possible, less frequent position changes than their opponents. If they fail to heed thiswarning and move too quickly toward a conclusion, they are likely to close most of the gapremaining between the parties.Patience and silence are two of the most effective techniques during the Closing Stage.Negotiators should employ “principled” concessions to explain the reasons for their exact moves.Following each announced position change, they should become silent and patiently await theother side’s response. They should not prattle on and disclose their anxiety, and they should notcontemplate further movement without reciprocity from the other side. They must remember thattheir adversaries are as anxious to achieve final terms as they are.When negotiators reach the Closing Stage, they should recognize that the time is ripe forsettlement. It is imperative that they keep the process moving inexorably toward a satisfactoryconclusion. While they should continue to use the techniques that got them this far, they shouldeschew the use of disruptive tactics such as walking out  hanging up the telephone. If someonebreaks off discussions at this crucial point, it may take days or even weeks for the parties to againachieve auspicious settlement conditions. Instead of employing negative threats or warnings, theyshould use affirmative promises that permit joint movement in a face-saving manner. Temporary
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impasses can be easily overcome through the promise of concurrent position changes that allowthe parties to move together.Skilled bargainers are often able to obtain a significant advantage during the Closing Stageby exhibiting a calm indifference. If they can persuade their anxious opponents that they really donot care whether final terms are achieved, their adversaries may be induced to close most of thedistance remaining between the parties.119 As those participants make more expansive and morefrequent concessions in an effort to guarantee an agreement, they significantly enhance the termsachieved by this side.The Closing Stage can be a highly competitive portion of the negotiation process. It ofteninvolves a substantial number of position changes and a significant amount of participantmovement. Negotiators who think that this part of the interaction consists primarily of cooperativebehavior are likely to obtain less beneficial results than strategic opponents who use this stage toinduce naive adversaries to close most of the outstanding distance between the two sides. As theyplan their closing strategies, negotiators must remember that their adversaries also wish to attainfinal accords. Their opponents may be even more anxious in this regard than they are. If theycarefully and deliberately move toward agreement, they may induce their more anxious opponentsto give them better deals than they deserve.
VII.  THE COOPERATIVE STAGE: VALUE MAXIMIZINGOnce the Closing Stage has been successfully completed through the attainment of amutually acceptable agreement, many persons consider the negotiation process finished. While
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this conclusion may be correct with respect to zero sum problems, such as the immediateexchange of money, where neither party could improve its results without a corresponding loss tothe other side,120 it is certainly not true for multi-issue encounters. Nonetheless, many participantsin multi-issue bargaining assume a fixed pie that cannot be expanded.121 This is rarely correct, dueto the different client preference curves involved.122 As a result, it is generally possible for thenegotiators to formulate proposals that may expand the pie and simultaneously advance theirrespective interests.Once a tentative accord has been reached through the distributive process, the negotiatorsshould contemplate alternative trade-offs that might concurrently enhance the interests of bothparties. The bargainers may be mentally, and even physically, exhausted from their priordiscussions, but they should at least briefly explore alternative formulations that may prove to bemutually advantageous. During the Information Stage, the parties often over- or under-state theactual value of different items for strategic reasons. During the Distributive and Closing Stages,they tend to be cautious and opportunistic. Both sides are likely to employ power bargainingtactics designed to achieve results favorable to their own circumstances. Because of the tensioncreated by these distributive techniques, Pareto superior arrangements are rarely attained by this
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point in the negotiation process. The participants are likely to have only achieved “acceptable”terms. If they conclude their interaction at this point, they may leave a substantial amount ofuntapped joint satisfaction on the bargaining table.In simulation exercises, it is easy to determine the extent to which negotiators havesuccessfully used the Cooperative Stage. By comparing the aggregate point totals attained by thetwo sides, one may assess the degree to which they maximized their joint results. For example,where two opponents might potentially divide 800 points between themselves, some participantswith proficient cooperative skills may reach an agreement giving them a combined total of 750 to800 points. On the other hand, less cooperative groups may end up with a joint total of 550 to 600points. These results graphically demonstrate to the participants the benefits to be derived fromcooperative bargaining. Had the latter negotiators been able to discover the 200 to 250 points theymissed, both would have left the table with more generous terms.If the Cooperative Stage is to develop successfully, several prerequisites must beestablished. First, the parties must achieve a tentative accord. Second, at the conclusion of theClosing Stage, one or both parties should suggest movement into the Cooperative Stage. If oneside is concerned that the other will be reluctant to progress in this direction until a provisionalagreement has been attained, it can suggest that both parties initial the terms they have alreadyagreed upon. Although proficient negotiators may occasionally merge the latter part of the ClosingStage with the introductory portion of the Cooperative Stage, most bargainers only move into theCooperative Stage after they have reached a mutually acceptable distribution of the pertinentitems.123
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It is crucial that both sides recognize their movement from the Closing to the CooperativeStage. If one party attempts to move into the Cooperative Stage without the understanding of theother, problems may arise. The alternative proposals articulated may be less advantageous to theother participant than the prior offers. If the recipient of these new positions does not view themas incipient cooperative overtures, she might suspect disingenuous competitive tactics. It is thusimperative that a party contemplating movement toward cooperative bargaining be sure heropponent understands the intended transition. When such a move might not be apparent, this factshould be explicitly communicated.Once the participants enter the Cooperative Stage, they should seek to discover thepresence of previously unfound alternatives that might be mutually beneficial. They must work toexpand the overall pie to be divided between themselves.124 They may have failed to consideroptions that would equally or even more effectively satisfy the underlying needs and interests ofone side with less cost to the other party.125 To accomplish this objective, the participants must bewilling to candidly disclose the underlying interests of their respective clients. Although theyshould have explored many of these factors during the Information, Distributive, and ClosingStages, they may not have done so with complete candor for strategic reasons. Each may haveover- or under-stated the value of different items to advance their competitive interests. Once atentative accord has been achieved, the parties should no longer be afraid of more opendiscussions.
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Both sides must be quite open during the Cooperative Stage if the process is to functioneffectively. Through the use of objective and relatively neutral inquiries, the participants shouldexplore their respective needs. They should use brainstorming techniques to develop options notpreviously considered. They should not be constrained by traditional legal doctrines orconventional business practices, recognizing that they can agree to anything that is lawful. Theyshould not hesitate to think outside the box.126  When one side asks the other if another resolutionwould be as good or better for it than what has already been agreed upon, the respondent must beforthright. It is only where the parties have effectively explored all of the possible alternatives thatthey can truly determine whether their initial agreement optimally satisfies their fundamentalneeds. As the participants enter the Cooperative Stage, they must be careful to preserve theircredibility. They may have been somewhat deceptive during the Information, Distributive, andClosing Stages with respect to actual client needs and interests. In the Cooperative Stage, theyhope to correct the inefficiencies that may have been generated by their prior dissembling. If theyare too open regarding their previous misrepresentations, however, their opponents may begin toquestion the accuracy of all their prior representations and seek to renegotiate the entire accord.127This would be a disaster. It is thus imperative that negotiators not overtly undermine theircredibility while they seek to improve their respective positions during the Cooperative Stage.It is important for persons participating in cooperative bargaining to appreciate the
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128 In my Legal Negotiation course, I assign point values for each item to be negotiated toapprise students of the relative values placed on the different terms from their respective clientperspectives. When representing real clients, attorneys should mentally do the same thing, as theyprobe underlying client needs and interests. The “essential” terms should have a higher valuethan the “important” terms, which should be valued more than merely “desirable” issues. Whilelawyers may not assign exact point values for each item, they should have a good idea of thecomparative value of the different terms.
competitive undercurrent that is present even during these seemingly win-win discussions. Whileparticipants are using cooperative techniques to expand the overall pie and improve the resultsachieved by both sides, some may also employ competitive tactics to enable them to claim morethan their share of the newly discovered areas for mutual gain. For example, if the participantsdiscover an additional “250 points”128 of client satisfaction that can be divided betweenthemselves, there is nothing that requires them to allocate 125 points to each side. If one partyrealizes that a proposed modification of the existing agreement could increase her client’ssituation by 150 or even 200 points, she might disingenuously indicate that the new proposalwould be a “slight improvement” to allow her to make her opponent think the new proposalwould only expand the overall pie by 75 or 100 points. She would then give her adversary 35 to50 points, and retain the other 100 to 150 points for her own side.To protect themselves from such exploitative behavior, negotiators should carefullyexplore the alternatives being mentioned. When an adversary indicates that a new proposal wouldbe somewhat better, they should ask themselves how much the new position would be likely toenhance opponent interests. They should already have a fairly good idea of the other side’sunderlying needs and interests from the Information and Distributive Stages, and they should besuspicious of any value representations that contradict their prior understandings.When the Cooperative Stage is finished, the participants almost always have a final
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agreement. It is helpful for negotiators to remember how beneficial it is to leave their opponentswith the feeling they got a good deal. If they have this impression, they are more likely to honorthe accord and to behave cooperatively when the same people have to negotiate in the future.Some advocates work to accomplish this objective by making the final concession on a matter nothighly valued by their own side.129Even a minimal position change at this critical point is likely tobe appreciated.130 Others try to accomplish the same goal by congratulating their adversaries onthe mutually beneficial agreement achieved.131 Bargainers must be careful, however, not to be tooeffusive. When negotiators lavish praise on their opponents at the conclusion of interactions, thoseindividuals may become suspicious and think they got poor deals.Once final agreements have been achieved, the parties often hang up the phones or departfor home, thinking that they are finished. As a result, they may fail to ensure a complete meeting of the minds. Before then conclude their interaction, participants should briefly review thespecific terms they think have been agreed upon. They may occasionally find misunderstandings.Since they are psychologically committed to agreements, they are likely to resolve theirdisagreements amicably. If they did not discover the misunderstandings until one side drafted theaccord, there might be claims of dishonesty and recriminations. It is thus preferable to confirm thebasic terms, before they conclude their encounter.At the conclusion of the bargaining process, one party will usually be expected to draft theterms agreed upon. Most proficient negotiators like to reserve the drafting process to themselves,
70recognizing that they will do a better job of drafting the provisions from their own side’sperspective than will the opposition. Honorable negotiators would not think of changing what hadbeen agreed upon, recognizing that such behavior would be completely unethical. Nonetheless,they would select language they think favors their side.If the opposing party drafts the final agreement, the side receiving that draft should go overit carefully. First, do they like the language that has been chosen for each term? If not, they shouldnot hesitate to mark up the draft with a pen or pencil. Second, is there anything in the draft thatwas never discussed? Nothing is “boilerplate” until both parties have agreed to it. Someone whoencounters a new provision should not hesitate to raise the matter with the other side. Third, hasanything the negotiators agreed upon been omitted from the draft agreement? When parties draftaccords, they tend to focus on the issues that most affect their own side. If they are not careful,they might forget to include certain provisions that are of  interest to their opponents. Since draftreviewers tend to focus on the specific language included, they may fail to recognize the omissionof non-essential provisions. As the reviewers read the draft provisions, they should check off theparts of their notes pertaining to those terms. When they are done, they should look for any areasof their notes not yet checked off.Once persons have reviewed opponent drafts, they will almost always have some questionsabout the precise language used or terms that were included or omitted. They should not assumedisingenuous behavior by their adversaries, because very few attorneys would think of usingdeceptive practices when drafting final accords. They should instead assume honest disagreementsand contact the drafters to clarify the uncertain terms. In almost all cases, the negotiating partieswill resolve their disagreements and achieve final language that is mutually acceptable.
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VIII CONCLUSIONMost individuals who negotiate regularly think of their interactions as unstructured events.If they appreciated how structured bargaining encounters are, they would feel more comfortableand achieve better results. They would understand what they should accomplish during each stage.Throughout the Preparation Stage, they have to ascertain the relevant facts, legal issues, economicconcerns, and, where relevant, political considerations. Once they have gathered these crucialpieces of information, they have to ask themselves three questions. What happens to their side ifthey fail to reach an agreement with the other party? The answer to this question defines theirbottom line. The second part of this same question focuses on the nonsettlement options availableto the other side. By comparing their own nonsettlement alternatives with those available to theother party, they can determine which side possesses greater bargaining power. They must thusestablish beneficial objectives, recognizing the direct relationship between aspiration levels andbargaining outcomes. They must finally determine where to begin the encounter, realizing thatanchoring will cause opponents to be emboldened by generous offers and have their confidenceundermined by less generous position statements.During the Preliminary Stage, the parties establish their identities and the tone for theinteraction. It is beneficial to establish positive negotiating environments, because these tend togenerate cooperative behavior and more efficient agreements. If participants do not like the way inwhich opponents begin bargaining encounters, they can use attitudinal bargaining to establishground rules for their interactions.Once the Preliminary Stage is finished, the parties move into the Information Stage, during
72which they endeavor to determine what is available to be divided between themselves. The bestway to obtain information about opponent interests and goals is to ask questions – preferablybroad, open-ended questions that force the other side to talk. The more they speak, the more theydisclose. Negotiators should not assume a fixed pie, and should look for ways to expand the areasto be divided to maximize the joint returns achieved by the parties. It is helpful to go beyond thestated positions of the parties to look for alternative formulations that might be mutuallybeneficial.After the Information Stage, during which the parties work to create value, they move intothe Distributive Stage, during which they claim value. This is a highly competitive part ofbargaining encounters, and negotiators should have thought-out concession patterns that are likelyto result in terms they find advantageous. During this portion of interactions, negotiators employarguments, threats, warnings, promises, silence, patience, and similar tactics designed to advancetheir interests. Bargainers should carefully monitor concession patterns to be sure one side is nottaking advantage of the other.Near the end of the Distributive Stage the participants see an agreement on the horizon,and enter the Closing Stage. If they get this far, they are likely to achieve final accords, but theyshould not rush the process. They should  avoid unreciprocated concessions of their own, whiletrying to induce their opponents to close more of the gap remaining between their currentpositions. The more anxious party that hopes to achieve definite terms quickly tends to close moreof the gap, providing the other side with an unwarranted gain.As the parties complete the Closing Stage, they should move into the Cooperative Stageduring which they hope to be sure they have agreed upon efficient terms. They should look for
73ways to expand the pie and simultaneously improve their respective positions. During theirprevious discussions, both parties have over- and under-stated the true value of items for strategicpurposes. As a result, items one side values more than the other may have ended up on the wrongside. If they can ascertain these terms and make efficient trades, they can reach the Pareto superiorpoint at which neither side can gain without the other losing something.Negotiators who are aware of the different stages of the bargaining process will understandwhat is occurring at each point, and they will know what they should be doing during each. Theywill be better prepared negotiators, and appreciate the best way to advance their interests. Theycan also ensure efficient agreements that maximize the joint returns attained by the bargainingparties. As a result, they will enjoy their bargaining encounters more and achieve better results.
